



Mind the Gap: Institutions and Strategic Choice in the Internationalization of UK 
Universities’ Operations in China 
 
1. Introduction 
Institution matters! The extant literature has clearly established the institution’s critical 
influence on organization's strategic choices in internationalisation (Ang, et al., 2015, 
Holmes, et al., 2013, Kostova, et al., 2008). Institutions set the rules of the game to regulate 
the behaviour of organizations (North, 1990). An effective strategic decision requires an 
organization to make sense of the institutional environment in which it is located (Young et 
al., 2014), and align its strategies and local operations with rules and expectations of 
institutions. Failing to do so would result in losing business opportunities, costs rising and 
even its local presence being threatened (Child, 1997). This is particularly challenging for 
organizations operating in international markets (Ang, et al., 2015). The institutional 
challenge is further amplified in a host country where institutions are in transition, such as 
emerging economies, in which organizational strategic choice must adapt to institutional 
ambiguity and changing institutions (Hernandez & Nieto 2015; Hennart & Slangen, 2015; 
Young et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Ra, 2008). The “institution 
void” and incomplete markets (Hoskisson, et al., 2000, Khanna & Palepu, 2010) limit 
international organizations from accessing to comprehensive information so as to fully assess 
institutional requirements. Strategic choices and operations are therefore often based on how 
organizations perceive institutions of host countries.  
Institutions have both a form and an informal dimension (North, 1990). Formal institutions - 
formal rules such as laws, regulations, professional standards and procedures - are codified, 
explicit and often in writing, and hence are readily observed and arguably easily changed. 
Informal institutions are unwritten rules and non-codified standards, being created and 
communicated through personalized processes and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels. Formal and informal institutions are not separate, but work together to complete the 
institutional landscape. On one hand, formal institutions begin as solutions to problems in 
society and are established as the result of ‘repeated games’ based on the shared 
understanding and acceptance of social actors. Understanding formal institutions requires 
comprehension of the logic and rationale underlying these solutions and informal consensus, 
i.e. informal institutions (Holmes, et al., 2013). On the other hand, formal institutions can be 
the result of formalizing and legalizing informal institutions when their significance is widely 
recognized, e.g. the establishment of property rights which was initially secured through the 
informal power of the gentry, emerged to ‘informal consensus’ and then settled as formal 
institutions. When formal institutions are incomplete, informal rules are created (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2004, Peng, 2003) and employing informal channels acts as an alternative strategy 
for organizations to achieve their goals (which cannot be achieved though formal institutions) 
(Holmes et al., 2013; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). However, despite their significance, 
informal institutions are often narrowly studied on cultural dimensions (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004, Hitt, et al., 2016, North, 1990) (Garrido et al., 2014; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Hitt, 
Li, & Xu 2016; North, 1990), treated as ex-post factors, or residuals after exhaustively 
discussing formal institutional mechanisms, or just being ignored (Hernandez and Nieto, 
2015).  
Departing from the extant literature, we take the stance advocated by North (1990) that 




interaction between formal and informal institutions that reveals that intricacies of  
institutional environment, which formulates perceived institution in the eyes of organizations’ 
decision makers. Although the extent literature has established that institutions matter for 
strategic choices, especially for organizations operating in emerging economies (Hitt, et al., 
2016, Peng, 2003), as noted by Brouthers (2013), “managerial attitudes drive decisions” and 
“when exploring the impact of institutional environments on decision-making, perceptions of 
the environment are all important” (p. 19). Through perceived institutions, organizations try 
to understand, make sense out of, and respond to institutional environment. The purpose of 
this article is to examine how the interaction of formal and informal institutions affects 
perceived institutional pressures at the time of internationalization, which in turn determines 
strategic choices in host country operations. By examining perceived institutions, we seek to 
provide a theoretical reasoning as to why different entry strategies and operation modes have 
been adopted by British universities in their internationalization to China.    
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 The interaction of formal and informal institutions and perceived institutions 
Formal institutions - formal rules such as laws, regulations, professional standards and 
procedures - are codified, explicit and often in writing, and hence are readily observed and 
arguably easily changed (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Formal institutions are created, 
communicated and enforced through officially sanctioned channels, and violation has legal 
consequences. A host country may use formal institutions to incentivize or constrain strategic 
choices that organizations can take for market entry, for example, some countries prohibit 
wholly-owned forms of operations, but encourage non-equity cooperative arrangements, as 
was the case in the early stage of China’s economic transition from a centrally planned to 
market economy. Organizations entering the Chinese market had little choice but to seek 
cooperation with local partners to bridge institutional gaps and overcome institutional barriers 
(Ang, et al., 2015, Peng, 2003).  
Informal institutions are unwritten rules and non-codified standards, being created and 
communicated through personalized processes and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, North, 1990). Violation of informal institutions has 
social rather than legal consequences, and the sanctioning mechanisms are often subtle and 
hidden, such as display of social disapproval and loss of reputation. Many studies draw on 
culture to capture informal institutions (Garrido et al., 2014; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Hitt, 
Li, & Xu 2016; North, 1990). However, informal institutions are behavioral regularities that 
go beyond shared cultural norms (Cantwell, et al., 2010). In defining informal institutions, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) advocate for shared expectations which may or may not be 
rooted in shared broader societal values (culture). Moreover, informal institutions also 
manifest through accepted authority systems and professional norms in an industry which 
may not be purely related to culture (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010). Hence, informal institutions 
are defined based on three key elements: actors' shared expectations, the context in which 
informal rules apply, and the ways of enforcement of informal rules (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004).  
Most existing research tends to analyze formal and informal institutions in a separate manner, 




analysis approach with an excessive attention to formal rules. Only a few studies recognize 
the interplay of informal institutions with formal institutions, e.g. Ang, et al. (2015), Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004), and Horak and Restel (2016). Helmke and Levitsky (2004) identify four 
types of formal-informal institutional interactions: (a) complementary - informal institutions 
coexist with effective formal institutions, filling in gaps in formal institutions and enhancing 
efficiency; (b) accommodating - informal institutions create incentives to behave in ways that 
alter, but not directly violate, the substantive effects of effective formal institutions; 
enhancing the latter’s stability; (c) competing - informal institutions coexist with ineffective 
formal institutions, structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules, 
e.g. clientelism, corruption; and (d) substitutive - informal institutions seek outcomes 
compatible with ineffective formal rules and procedures, achieve what formal institutions 
were designed, but not routinely enforced (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Lauth, 2000). 
However, Horak and Restel (2016) reckon that the above categorization is too static, 
neglecting informal institutions' interaction with developing formal institutions (neither 
effective nor ineffective, but in transition, e.g. China). Focusing on guanxi, as an informal 
institution, Horak and Restel (2016) find guanxi does not perfectly fit into any one of Helmke 
and Levitsky (2004) proposed categories. Given our research context of China, this is 
particularly relevant.  
Guanxi stands out because of its degree to interact with formal institutions and its influence 
in every aspect of Chinese life (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Guanxi is a relationship embedded in a 
complex social network between objects, forces, and people, and involves a chain of 
benefactors and beneficiaries connected by intermediaries. It implies links established on 
trust, trustworthiness and reciprocity between individuals and groups and can mobilize the 
process of institutional change, especially when formal institutions are ineffective (Horak & 
Restel, 2016, Xin & Pearce, 1996). Guanxi has two key components: renqing (obligatory 
reciprocity) and mianzi (face or social prestige). Renqing means the social norms of giving 
and receiving favors on the basis of mutual obligation and reciprocity. Within the guanxi 
network, albeit the time of payment is flexible, payment is expected and not honoring renqing 
carries social penalty, i.e. the loss of mianzi. The informal institution of guanxi offers a 
channel through which businesses can gain access to resources, facilitate transactions and 
solve disputes. Underdeveloped formal institutions result in an unstable environment and 
create a void, guanxi remains a way to achieve goals in order to overcome the voids left by 
formal institutions (Horak & Restel, 2016). Hence, guanxi is an institutionally driven 
dynamic construct as it changes the function and character of formal institutions over the 
course of institutional building (Horak & Restel, 2016, Peng, et al., 2008).  
The relationship between guanxi and formal institutions is auxiliary (i.e. supporting formal 
institution building) and competing (i.e. suppressing formal institutional building), leading to 
both convergent (make systems evolving) and divergent (replacement or modification of the 
existing formal institutions) outcomes (Horak & Restel, 2016). As China making a transition 
from centrally-planned economy to market economy, economic systems of the command 
economy were dismantled, which created institutional voids and the formal institutional 
environment was generally unpredictable, volatile and ambiguous for businesses. Over time, 
government, legal, financial and economic institutions essential to a market-oriented system 
have been emerging, strengthened and/or legitimated. During this process, guanxi as an 
informal institution has brought some clarity into the uncertain formal institutional 
environment. It has filled formal institutional voids. It has influenced, both positively and 




institution building. Hence, the interaction of informal institutions with formal institutions 
can exhibit a dynamic nature. This dynamic feature is also pertinent in other emerging 
economies not only China, where political and economic reforms bring about formal and 
informal institutional changes (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010). Businesses have to navigate an 
institutional landscape of both formal and informal institutions. This interplay between 
formal institutions and guanxi as an informal institution in China poses even more challenges 
for international organizations entering the Chinese market given their liability of foreignness 
(Hitt & Xu, 2015).  
As institutions are typically context-specific, organizations evaluate institutional environment 
of a country with regard to a specific business operation (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010, 
Brouthers, 2013). In an environment characterized by the lack of reliable market information, 
extensive state intervention in business operations, lack of effective mechanisms to enforce 
contracts, as is the case of China, objective evaluation of institutions is difficult and often it is 
the subjective perceptions of decision makers that determine strategic choices (North, 2005). 
The institutional uncertainties are perceived high when decision markers could not fully 
understand how components of institutional environment change, how the changes impact on 
the organization, and what response options are available to the organization (due to the lack 
of knowledge of response options, the lack of resources to respond, or inability to predict the 
likely consequences of a response choice) (Milliken, 1987). Added to the complication is also 
the fact that institutional constraints and enablers are not only from the country-level setting, 
a given professional or industry community, but also from organizations themselves (firm-
specific conditions, e.g. the established reputation, resources, strategy, structure, experience 
etc.). Institutional pressures, thus, come from a collective and interconnected environment; 
misunderstanding macro- and micro- institutional expectations may lead to failure in 
international expansion (Roxas, et al., 2008).  
 
2.2 Perceived institutions and strategic choices in internationalization  
Uncertain and ambiguous institutional environment can mean both opportunities and threats 
to international organizations. The level of perceived uncertainties determines whether 
organizations taking a proactive or a reactive strategy (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). 
Proactive organizations may make higher-level of resource commitment, introduce 
innovative strategies, structures and processes to respond to institutional changes, and adopt 
preventive measures to counteract the potential negative effect of institutional changes, while 
reactive organizations may make lower-level resource commitment and focus on mitigating 
the risks associated with the uncertainties. International organization’s strategic choices of 
entry are contingent upon decision makers’ perception on institutions related to legitimacy 
attainment and stakeholder alignment (Hitt, et al., 2016, Roxas, et al., 2008). When 
organizations perceive high institutional pressures in a host market, they tend to take a lower-
resource commitment mode and rely on local partners for achieving external legitimacy, 
whereas a higher-resource commitment mode and working in collaboration with local 
partners could be adopted in response to stronger stakeholder alignment. Although 
international organizations tend to favor standardized operations over localization to maintain 
consistency, synergy and improve efficiency (Peng, 2003), the degree of standardization or 
localization varies from organization to organization depending on aligning the responses to 
host country institutional environment which is subject to the interpretation of institutional 




encourage international organizations to standardize operations in order to learn from new 
practices, and this learning process can culminate in changing formal and informal 
institutions in the host country over time (Cantwell, et al., 2010).  
Legitimacy attainment in internationalization is linked to unfamiliarity hazards and relational 
hazards. The first arises from a lack of information and knowledge about the host country and 
the second from difficulties in managing and monitoring subsidiaries or partnerships at a 
distance (Hitt, et al., 2016). Compared to formal institutions, understanding informal 
institutions is even more challenging, especially for organizations coming from a country that 
is institutionally distant from the host country. Different norms, values and beliefs can pose 
considerable challenges in the process of communication and management of the operations 
in the host country. To conform to informal institutions and gain legitimacy, organizations 
need to behave in line with professional groups' expectations and norms irrespective of 
economic rationality (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010, Ang, et al., 2015). Inter-firm relationships 
among partners from institutionally distant environments were subject to governance 
difficulties due to the paucity of shared cognitive and normative frameworks (Abdi & 
Aulakh, 2012; Hitt, Li, & Xu, 2016). Decision makers of organizations from a home country 
with a mature institutional environment have internalized market-based competition as the 
basis of organizational strategies. When facing an immature formal institutions and different 
informal institutions in an emerging economy, such decision makers are often challenged to 
change their inherent cognitive beliefs and values, adapt to and conform to a host 
environment (Peng, 2003). For example, political connections may come to be a very 
important source of a firm's competitive advantage in emerging markets, and hence do not 
have the same negative connotations in China that it does for Western firms (Young et al., 
2014). Therefore, business practices established in the developed markets need to be adjusted 
when operating in developing economies (Meyer & Peng, 2005).  
Oliver (1997) suggests that firms can develop institutional capital to enhance the use of their 
resources within their institutional environment. Organizations can increase their strategic 
choice by immersing themselves in political networks (Rodrigues & Child, 2003). Through 
creative organizational designs, some organizations can manage unfavourable institutional 
effects on their operation better than others (Regner & Edman, 2014; Lau et al., 2002). 
Hence, organizations are able to protect their interest through responsiveness to external 
demands and expectations. Although there are a variety of alternative institutional 
arrangements to conform to in a given environment (North 2005), introducing and 
implementing new operational forms to gain legitimacy may encounter different challenges at 
formal and informal institutional levels (Xu & Shenkar 2002). On the one hand, this requires 
organizations to have the ability to see beyond the formal and informal institutional 
conditions of their surrounding host country environment to recognize institutional 
differences and identify opportunities. On the other hand, the organizations also need to 
understand the audiences' assumptions and beliefs what the organization could legitimately 
do, and transfer resources into the local operations (e.g. knowledge, assets or practices gained 
from operations in diverse institutional settings) (Regner & Edman, 2014). In operations, 
implementing a new organizational mode entails strategic decisions of the extent to which a 
mode of operation is to be standardized (implementing home standard operations, being 
consistent across borders) and localized (adjust the home standard operations to adapt the 
local institutions) on which organization could leverage to respond to the perceived 
institutional pressures. However, studies on how organizations strategize in operations to 




underexplored. This study will take UK universities in China as an example to examine how 
interaction of informal and formal institutions affect organizations' perception of institutions 
and how the UK universities strategize their operations in China to responses to different 
perceived institutional pressures - a gap in the existing literature that this paper seeks to fill.  
3. Methodlogy 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
We adopted a qualitative case study research strategy (Yin, 2009) to answer our key research 
question. We followed Eisenhardt's (1989) theoretical sampling and Buck's (2011) case 
selection process. First, we defined the sample frame - a total of 60 UK universities operating 
in China and conferring UK degrees1 (QAA, 2006). Second, to ensure the representativeness 
of our sample, we used a stratified sampling to draw samples from two different types of 
international entry in China2: equity and non-equity mode. The former only covers equity 
joint venture (EJV) - a separate legal educational entity, established by two HE institutions 
from China and a foreign country, as wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) is not permitted in 
China. There are two UK-invested EJVs. Non-equity modes are strategic alliances between a 
UK and a Chinese university with operations on the campus of the Chinese university. Non-
equity modes accounted for 98% of international HE operations in China. They can be 
classified into single-based (SB) mode where a UK degree program is entirely taught in 
China, and dual-based (DB) mode where a UK degree program is taught in both China and 
the UK. DB can be further classified into dual-based validation where the program taught in 
China was designed by the Chinese university and validated by the UK university (DB-v), 
and dual-based franchise where the program was designed and franchised by the UK 
university (DB-f). In terms of the level of resource commitment, strategic choice ranked from 
high to low is EJV, SB, DB-f and DB-v. Finally, we ensured that each case selected must 
have been in operation for at least two years to allow us to assess the operations. In total, 10 
cases were carefully selected based on theoretical justifications (Eisenhardt, 1989): two EJVs, 
two SBs, three DB-fs, and three DB-vs (see Table 1).   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
We conducted a pilot case study of a single-based operation, before finalizing the final 
interview schedule. The final case study was conducted by the first author through face-to-
face interviews in 2008 and 2009. Follow-up interviews were conducted wherever necessary 
to keep track of any further development until the end of 2015. Secondary data from 
publications were also collected to triangulate and complement the interview data.  Each case 
was approached from both China and UK sides to take into account the corporate and the 
subsidiary perspectives.  
 
1 Campus-based face-to-face learning modes only. Distance learning was excluded, as the 
Chinese government does not recognize a degree obtained from a China-foreign cooperation 
through distant learning (MoE, 2003). 
2 In 2003, the Chinese government deregulated the HE market to allow foreign universities to 





          Within each case, we used purposive sampling (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to identify and 
select informants who were most knowledgeable about the international operations (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2009), including Chancellor/Vice-Chancellors (VCs)/Pro-Vic-
Chancellors (PVCs) (UK) or President/Vice President (China), Deans/Heads of Departments 
(HoDs), project directors, coordinators, and academic members of staff (see Table 1). 
Students were also interviewed where possible. The number of interviews for each case was 
determined when theoretical saturation was achieved - at the point when additional interviews 
failed to dispute existing or reveal new categories or relationships, indicating a point of 
diminishing returns (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In 
total, 45 interviews were conducted. The interviews were about 1.5 hours each, all recorded 
and transcribed. 
          Interviews were semi-structured, and questions focused on institutions and 
organizations' strategic choices in internationalization in the areas of: a) motives of 
internationalization, and the formal and informal institution constraints and enablers; b) 
rationales of chosen modes and the role of the interaction of informal and formal institutions 
and the balancing of perceived institutional pressures; and c) the changes of institutions and 
their impacts on the development of local operations.  
 
3.3 Data analysis [Xiaoqing, I have not read through this section.] 
 
Following Eisenhardt's (1989) and Glaser and Strauss (1967), we adopted three key steps to 
analyze the data (see Figure 1). First, we use informant-centric analysis (first-order concepts) 
to code formal and informal institutional constrains and enablers and their interaction effects. 
This step adhered faithfully to informant terms, codes and categories (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). We sought similarities and differences among the codes, and give each category a 
phrasal descriptor (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012). Constant comparison was employed to 
allow us to distinguish differences between the emerging categories and those in the existing 
literature.  
          Second, we developed researcher-centric concepts and themes (second-order themes) 
to discern patterns of perceived institutional pressures (tensions between standardization and 
localization). We used within-case analysis and cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989) to 
view the first-order concepts at a higher level of theoretical referents (second-order themes) 
(Gioia et al., 1994). This step revealed relationships between interaction of formal and 
informal institutions and perceived institutional pressures (standardization and localization). 
After examining category nestings and overlaps (Clark et al, 2010), three second-order 
themes emerged (see Figure 1). In this process, constant consulting the literature helped us 
capture similar or different themes.   
          Third, we assembled our three second-order themes into aggregate dimensions of local 
operations to examine patterns of strategic choices to respond to the perceived institutional 
pressures (managing the tensions between standardization and localization). We first zoomed 
into each case to capture key arrangement of local operations in managing the tension and 
constantly compared cases to identify patterns of solutions. We then examined the 
overarching relationships among interactions, the patterns of perceived pressures, and 
strategic choices to gain confidence that our analytical framework - an enhanced theoretical 
model (institutions and firm' strategic choices) was consistent with the internationalization 
experience of both the UK universities and their Chinese subsidiaries, following the Clark et 
al.’s (2010) advice on the consistency between theoretical development and the experience of 
those living the experience. To ensure the validity of the data and avoid interpretative bias, 




discussions of conference papers. Initial findings were also presented to the participant 
universities, and their feedback was incorporated to validate the research findings.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 The evolution of institutions in the Chinese HE sector  
 
Chinese HE sector was interrupted and many universities were not led by intellectuals during 
the ‘Cultural Revolution’ between 1966 and 1977, which created formal institution voids and 
a change of informal institutions as university education became less valued. Following the 
re-introduction of the university examination in 1977, the HE sector had been developed very 
quickly in the direction of ‘four modernizations’ and the general institutional environment 
had become more permissive for university education, nonetheless remaining rigidly 
centralized with the state controlling many if not all aspects of university operations 
including the appointments of senior leaders and academic staff, curriculum, teaching 
resources such as textbooks, and the establishment of departments and institutes. Late 1990s 
marked a monumental shift in HE institutions with the government launching a program of 
massive expansion of universities. The number of university graduates increased by 10-times 
between 1997 and 2017, reaching 8-million. 3  Alongside substantial increase of state 
investment in universities, the university financing model also moved from full state subsidy 
to marketization with sponsorship from non-state forces including students, companies and 
other organizations. Universities gained increasing institutional autonomy. Private and 
foreign education providers were permitted to operate in the Chinese market.  
 
Among the major legislative and policy guidelines on HE reforms issued, what is particularly 
relevant to UK universities’ internationalization are: 1995 Interim Provisions on Chinese-
Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools (CFCRS), 2003 Regulations on CFCRS and 2004 
Implementation Measures for the Regulations on CFCRS (see Table 2). 1995 Interim 
Provisions, as the first legal document, signaled a significant formal institutional environment 
change shifting from an informal, incidental, laissez-faire stage to state-guided market-
oriented. Nevertheless, it did not specify what a program-based operation looked like, how 
foreign universities operated it and so on. Its focus was very much on vocational education 
and HE was not given priority. 2003 Regulation is the first one allowing foreign universities 
to operate in China in an EJV mode. The formal institutional change in HE was to align with 
China's commitment to WTO (entered WTO in 2001), to meet the increasing demand for 
highly qualified human resources, driven by rapid economic development and globalisation. 
The 2004 Implementation Measures clarified that SBs were permitted. Incremental changes 
in formal institutions have continued after 2004, as detailed in Table 2, demonstrating a 
dynamic institutional environment moving from a systematic, structured, regulated but 
turbulent to a more standardized, strictly regulated and relatively stable HE market in China.  
 
During the process of formal institutional building aiming to provide judicial protection and 
reduce ambiguity, informal institutions have also changed. Social norms and mental models 






open, market economy oriented. Western culture was understood widely and deeply 'After 20 
to 30 years' implementation of reform and open policy, culture difference has not been an 
important issue, generally speaking, the place of B (a city where EJV2 locates) is very open 
(PVC, UK, EJV2).' The shortcomings of the Chinese HE were recognized and customers 
were more desired to know and learn from the world-class universities.  
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
4.2 The interaction of formal and informal institutions and perceived institutions  
Facing the same formal institutional environment, not all UK universities made the same 
strategic choices for entry. Nine UK universities in our sample entered China at around 
similar time, i.e. between 2002-2004. Five adopted DB, two SB and two EJV. An exception 
to this was the case of DB-v3, which entered after 2003 with a low-commitment arrangement, 
but was not solicited by the MoE. The two SB cases were initiated before 2003 at a time 
when the formal rules on SB were unavailable. SB1 was the first China-foreign cooperation 
on a SB mode issuing dual bachelor degrees by the Chinese and the UK university, whereas 
SB2 issued a single UK degree at the Masters level. In the case of EJV1, a proposal was sent 
to the MoE a year ahead of the 2003 Regulation when EJV university was a new concept and 
there were no clear formal specific rules on it. EJV2 was initiated before the issue of 
Implementation Measures, also meaning to break the traditional education provision in China 
and a Western education model taking root.  
In the case of EJVs, the UK universities were aware of the ambiguity and uncertainty of 
institutional environment in China, but they saw these as opportunities and proactively 
engage in internationalization in China.  
‘Before we signed this cooperative agreement with (the British) University in March 2003, 
we did consultations with a lot of experts including lawyers and university professors; but we 
were told there were no specific regulations to abide by (for operating on an EJV mode) 
(Chairwomen of the Chinese partner, EJV1).’  
‘China is an important country we need to know about, to interact with, to engage with. This 
(to form an EJV) is a very solid, practical and concrete way of doing it (DVC, UK, EJV2).’  
Guanxi of the University’s senior management team (SMT) played an important role in 
helping pursue the organizational goals. The useful ties and contacts the established Guanxi 
brought in (initiated from personal links of a Chancellor in EJV1 and a PVC in EJV2, both 
are of Chinese-origin) created a platform where the UK side could exchange for dependable 
information about the partner and the host market. Some of the critical information was 
unavailable in the market and through formal channels. More importantly, the key actors who 
knitted the informal network, were reputable and highly regarded in China. They initiated 
talks with government officials (interact with formal institutions) to help break through 
formal institutional barriers. They helped convince the Chinese government how a new mode 
of operation was operated in a way which could meet the need of and contribute to China's 
formal institutional reform and rapid economic development. This enabled the UK 
universities to secure business opportunities not widely opened to foreign universities. 
'The Chair of our Chinese partner used her personal relationship, arranged a lot talks with 




reputation, not only developed talks with central government officials himself, but also 
arranged us to meet with central and provincial government officials. The information we got 
from these talks was unavailable in the market hence particularly critical before the 2003 
Regulation was issued. The support we received made us confident to set up a JV university 
(PVC, UK, EJV1).’ 
'... to address to the Chinese government why this university (EJV) is worth building 
challenged us. However, our PVC knew how to approach the question. He understood the 
Chinese context in a way that we wouldn’t. He did a lot of explaining on what we are about 
to Chinese authorities. Without that kind of intermediary, we couldn’t have got far (DVC, 
UK, EJV2).' 
The interaction helped better interpretation of the ambiguous formal institutional environment 
for the UK side, e.g. the government's expectation from the China-foreign operations in HE 
in China had been changing from capacity building to quality improving. The government 
had become more selective and expected renown foreign universities to invest high quality 
educational resources in China. The two UK universities' prestigious brand name, an 
innovative method to ensure quality, and a demonstrable commitment helped them gain 
government support, not only in term of favourable institutional environment changes, but 
also finance, land, and resources.  
Therefore interaction helped the UK side have correct understanding of institutional 
expectations and made them confident to implement a high commitment mode, a preferred 
one for organizational interests and stakeholder alignment. The two UK universities had the 
highest ranking compared to others examined in this study. An EJV with ownership right 
helped maintain and enhance the established reputation in the global market through the 
consistent quality education delivered across borders.  
'This is our second international campus, offering our degree. To maintain the university's 
reputation and ensure the consistency of the operation, the same quality insurance system is 
applied there, and staff were seconded from the UK with continuous links (PVC, UK, EJV1).’  
An EJV mode which allowed the standardized UK HE to be implemented overseas also 
satisfied home institutional requirement, e.g. the QAA (Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education, UK, conducts reviews to secure academic standards and quality in all 
internationally delivered UK HE).  
In comparison to EJV, the two UK universities employing SB mode (joint programs) felt 
high risks to operate on an EJV mode resulted from perceived high institutional uncertainties, 
but they did see market opportunities and took a proactive strategy by adopting an entry 
mode that was new to the Chinese market and contained limited risks to their organizations.  
‘Strategically, it does not make sense. Why should we be people who are spending money 
getting into a campus or agreement on fixed assets in an overseas location? I believe that 
overseas investment causes various problems due to the potential changes at that premises 
for international, political or economic reasons (PVC, UK, SB2).’ 
 
'When we started to apply to the MoE for the approval of this mode of operation, the 




Schools were not issued, so we had to draw on existing regulations and documents that are 
relevant e.g. the Regulation on Chinese-foreign Cooperation in Running Schools, the 
Education Law, and the Higher Education Law of the People's Republic of China, to design 
our project (Head of International School, SB1, China).' 
However, these documents did not specify how to operate a particular SB mode, and the UK 
universities relied on Guanxi to help achieve internationalization goals. Similar to EJV cases, 
Guanxi was employed to interact with formal institutions but at the faculty level developed 
by Deans of the responsible faculties from both sides.  
'There was a strong personal relationship developed between me and the Dean of the faculty 
(of the Chinese university), and based on that, confidence grew’ (PVC, UK, SB2).  
'A lot of meetings with MoE officials were arranged through informal relationship developed 
by the Dean of our Chinese partner. We shared with them what we (and our Chinese partner 
university) expect to do, how our cooperative project looks like. We received great support 
from the MoE. The deputy director of the Department of Cooperation and Exchange at the 
MoE also met us. The MoE attached great attention to our project, and provided guidance 
and advice on how to work on this mode (Director, responsible department, SB1, UK).' 
The Chinese government expected foreign universities to work on areas that were of urgent 
national need to address weakness in China and this could be built on the UK university's 
expertise in some advanced subject-specific areas at the department level. This message was 
transmitted to the UK universities. The two universities though had lower ranking than those 
in EJVs, they had strong reputation in specific subject areas, e.g. the Department of 
Electronic Engineering ranked 13th in the country out of the 132 institutions in the RAE 
exercise in 20084 in SB1, whereas the UK university in SB2 was famous for International 
Trade and Finance disciplines. The two Chinese partner universities were also leading in 
these two areas respectively. These enabled the joint programs built on both-side’s strengths. 
Therefore, the perceived high institutional pressures drove the UK side to reject a JV mode, 
but to pioneer a new mode with lower commitment than an EJV, to achieve their 
internationalization ambition in China. 
UK universities adopted DB modes perceived extremely high institutional pressures, 
passively reacted to the internationalization into China. The UK universities in this group 
entered China earlier than those in EJVs and SBs, and the earliest dated in 1996. Guanxi was 
established between two sides through the introduction of an agent or through a previous 
employee incidentally. The lack of well-established informal institutional channels at senior 
levels was not conducive to the key decision makers' understanding of the formal and 
informal institutions in China. This drove them to rely on the Chinese partners when making 
decisions. 
'This project started in 1996 when international cooperative projects were hardly found 
among UK universities. I started my work as a lecturer here (the UK university) in 1995, and 
one of my classmates who was working at T (the Chinese partner university), who is now the 
deputy president, approached me. But, I was not responsible for any decisions, I just worked 
 




as a middle woman, and helped arrange them to meet our managers. … At the beginning, our 
Vice-Chancellor doubted this, and he thought there would not be many students, as he 
perceived that Chinese people could not afford this. So their visits (from the Chinese partner 
university) were not well received by our university (Professor of Information System, who is 
Chinese, UK, DB-f1).' 
'He (the Chinese classmate working at the Chinese partner university) learnt during his 
training in the Central Communist Party School that the HE market in China would be 
liberalized and opened up. Their university had cooperated with an American university on a 
2+1 model. He wanted to do the same with our university. So he proposed this mode to us 
(Professor of Information System, who is Chinese, UK, DB-f1).'  
A low commitment mode was also perceived suitable by the UK universities due to 
organization-specific constraints. The UK universities in this group had lower rankings than 
the UK universities with EJV or SB modes. They were relatively less competitive at home 
and the home market is fiercely competitive due to demographic changes resulting in lack of 
market growth potential (e.g. the 18 year old population in the UK was projected to decline 
by 16.2% between 2009 and 2020 and 14.1% in the EU countries, GAD, 2007) and 
challenges from foreign universities, such as universities from the US, Australia, Canada and 
the EU countries courting students with substantial financial aid package and/or cheaper 
tuition fees than the UK universities. Lower-ranked UK universities were forced to seek 
alternative growth strategies. They might be in the third tier at home, but could present 
themselves as having higher status overseas by cooperating with prestigious local 
universities. The first mover advantages, plus increased reputation in a global market would 
mitigate their weak competitive position in the home market. A low committed mode was 
hence preferred to be used to test the uncertain market and the partnership.  
'Our strategy is to develop with a small number of good partners, so it is not just about going 
for growth and attempting to get a lot of money. We want to have partners who can help us 
build our reputation'. (Director, UK, DBv2) 
'We will not do this for nothing, there is cost involved in it. We need students, so we recruit 
students where we can find them. The beauty of the 2+1 is, once they (Chinese partner) 
recruited students, you would be very confident that they would come to you (Coordinator, 
UK, DB-f2).'   
4.3 Perceived institutions and strategic choices of mode of operations 
Corresponding to four entry modes employed in UK universities' local operations: EJV, SB, 
DB-f and DB-v, the core elements (teaching, research, and management) and peripheral 
elements (e.g. physical campus, library, facilities, employment or placement services) were 
standardized or localized to different degrees in order to manage the perceived pressures, as 
detailed in Table 3 and 4.  
Indeed, the perceived institutional pressures on the UK side to implement the first one and 
two EJVs were high, as a full-fledge university exposed the location operations (core and 
peripheral) to a wide range of institutional settings and stakeholders and no established 
models to learn (JV1 started from business management, and saw China campus as the baby 
of the UK university; JV2 focused on science and technology, and treated China campus as a 




Guanxi and formal institutions helped the UK side better understood the government's 
expectations, needs in the Chinese market and customers. For example, to a certain extent, 
the UK side knew that the Chinese government expected an EJV to bring in the authentic UK 
education (standardized) on which the government can draw to improve the Chinese 
education and the formal institutional environment in HE. At the same time, the Chinese 
governments (central and local) also required an EJV to adapt to local market needs (e.g. 
develop research that was urgently needed in China) and regulations (e.g. include some 
compulsory Chinese modules in the teaching). Therefore, the interaction helped the UK side 
prevent conflicts with local governments and other stakeholders in operations. This helped 
relieve the perceived institutional pressures. The interaction enabled the UK universities to 
act innovatively in managing the perceived institutional pressures.  
To manage the perceived institutional pressures for standardization (bring the authentic UK 
education in China expected by Chinese governments, customers, QAA, and UK universities 
themselves), teaching was 100% standardized by deploying long-term UK secondees onsite 
in EJVs.  
''It is crucial that staff are dominantly ours (UK secondees). They carry our university's DNA, 
and assured that we have academic control.'' (PVC, UK, JV1) 
However, 100% UK standardized teaching entailed high costs in terms of paying secondees 
UK-standard salary, plus 30% expatriate fees, travel expenses, and the relocation of the 
secondees' families to China.  A 1/3 mixed structure in human resources as a long-term 
strategy was discussed through the interaction and employed in operations (1/3 seconded 
from the UK university; 1/3 internationally recruited on the UK university's standards; and 
1/3 from the Chinese partner, who only worked on the foundation program in Year 1 plus 
administration work). This one-third contribution approach was later reflected in the 2003 
Regulation. 
The arrangement of long-term secondees onsite not only guaranteed the teaching quality in 
delivering the UK standard programs, but also helped to manage perceived adaptation 
pressures (e.g. to respond to market needs). For example, in EJV2, the UK secondees 
provided expertise to develop new programs, one of them was on Chemistry to meet the 
needs of UK pharmaceutical companies operating in China. To respond to the perceived 
adaptation pressures of including compulsory modules in a UK degree program delivery and 
at the same time maintaining the authentic UK education (foreignness)  the length and 
structure of a UK academic program were adjusted in both EVJs and in SB1(where a dual 
degree was issued in China).    
'While keeping the standard of our degree programs identical with that in the UK, we 
adjusted that a UK degree program will be delivered in four years in China rather than three 
years (original pattern in the UK) in order to include compulsory modules in Year one' 
(Director for Transnational Education, UK, JV1). 
While the organization-specific conditions (no Guanxi at university senior level, department 
level initiative) constrained the UK side to make great organizational changes to 
internationalize to China, the perceived institutional pressures to engage in an EJV mode 
were high. In addition, the UK universities in this group initiated their entry a bit earlier than 
those in EJVs, e.g. SB2 started in 2002 during which the formal institutional environment 




'Our Chinese partner already has an excellent campus. You know how long the political 
process in establishing a campus in China is. If your Chancellor is a Chinese who has strong 
consciousness to the scientific community in China at a national level, you may want to 
establish a campus. However, you may not be able to take any money from that campus, you 
might find students to complain bitterly about the quality of the campus, you might find out 
local competitors who do not like having a campus (EJV) in their particular setting, or you 
might find there are sort of political or economic issues that you want to resist' ((PVC, UK, 
SB2). 
However, the interaction between Guanxi and formal institutions helped the UK side to 
explore alternative ways in operations to manage the perceived institutional pressures while 
the scale of the local operations shrunk from focusing on an EJV campus to one or two 
programs. For example, an affordable way to manage the perceived institutional pressures for 
standardization was discussed, and the UK side used fly-in/out UK staff instead of long-term 
stay secondees to teach the core part of a UK degree program in a block structure (intensive 
teaching of 1 or 2 weeks for a module, accounted 50% of teaching. It was difficult for 
students to digest the intensively taught content, the Chinese partner fill up the rest 50% 
teaching hours to assist the learning. The interaction also made the UK side know that, in a 
SB mode with a dual degree issued in China (SB1), compulsory Chinese modules must be 
included; to meet students' demand (e.g. to prepare for the national entrance exams for doing 
postgraduate study) additional necessary Chinese modules in the final year were also added. 
To adapt to market demand, management, and law were added to the UK's 
telecommunication and e-commerce degree programs respectively in SB1. However, 
compared to EJVs,  SB operations incurred much less costs of standardization. Same as that 
in EJVs, the interaction facilitated the formal institutional changes, e.g. the formulation of the 
Implementation Measures in 2004 drew on some of the practices employed by the first 
China-foreign SB operation.  
Notably, in DB modes, the perceived high institutional pressures by the UK universities 
remained no change due to the lack of established Guanxi and interaction with formal 
institutions. The UK universities in this group initiated their entry to China much earlier than 
those in SBs and EJVs. Although the first legal document 1995 Interim Provision was issued, 
signalling a significant formal institutional environment change, how to operate a UK 
program in China was not clearly explained. Social norms, customers' mental models were 
still dominated by the effect of a closed, planned economy although evolving towards a 
market-oriented institutional change. The UK universities perceived high institutional 
pressures due to the difficulties and lack of channels to understand the formal and informal 
institutional expectations.  The perceived high institutional pressures deterred the UK side to 
work on a high commitment mode. Teaching was hence 100% taught by local tutors. In DB 
franchises, the UK side tried to  standardize the local operations by providing lecture slides 
and teaching materials to local tutors. Local tutors were also inducted to the UK style of 
teaching through training, attending model lectures, and visiting the UK to shadow the 
module leader's teaching. However, managing the perceived pressures for standardization 
was challenging and the consistency in delivery remained a concern in DB franchises.  
'The challenge has been ensuring that the students get an equivalent education in China as 
they do here (in the UK). That means to ensure the members of staff in China teach 100% in 




by members of staff in China, when students ask questions, teachers will speak Chinese 
rather than English to explain in more details (Associate Dean of Department, UK, DBf2).'  
Notably, maintaining standardization in DB franchises was even more challenging when 
operating on programs required the same tacit understanding of the UK materials between 
local tutors and the module designers in the UK.    
'We are very good at art, but it is not easy to do with this model. For art, you cannot teach 
just with notes, you need to have the same thinking and the way you look at arts should be the 
same as the program designer, so finding the right person to teach is more difficult than 
other programs, like business (Head of China Management Centre, UK, DB f2).'  
In the DB validations, where the perceived institutional pressures reached highest among the 
investigated cases, the UK side turned to the Chinese partner universities in terms of  design 
and delver the program. The UK side provided teaching slides but did not pay attention to 
whether the local tutors used it or not. Therefore, the cost of operations in the DB modes was 
the lowest among all the modes employed.  
As for research, the interaction enabled the UK side to understand the institutional pressures 
for standardization (e.g. not only the seconded UK staff needed to continue their research; 
research students also expected to access authentic UK resources; international companies 
demanded world-class research) and localization (local government and industries expected 
to solve local problems) and hence the two EJVs placed a great emphasis on research, aiming 
to develop into research-led institutions. Both EJVs set up research centres, where research 
expertise brought by the long-term secondees was integrated with that of the local partners. 
Moreover, JVs’ research also focuses on local needs. For example, EJV1’s research on air 
pollution, sustainable energy and innovative industry technology was of significance to 
densely populated countries like China and EJV2’s on cutting-edge nanotechnology, new 
materials, 4G wireless technology and metabolic syndrome drug research was highly 
desirable in a developing market.  
However, unlike in EJVs where a formal structure (e.g. research centres and joint projects 
and PhD supervision) was in place, research was not given priority in SB. Research links in 
SB1 and SB2 were informal, relied on staff's own initiatives. Although the Chinese partners 
expressed the interest in research collaboration, teaching was seen as the main operation by 
the UK universities.  Research was not on the agenda in the DB operations.  
 
In terms of management, the perceived institutional pressures came from a wide range of 
institutional settings related to academic and non-academic issues. For example, the pressures 
for standardization to meet the government's expectation (learning from the authentic UK 
HE), to maintain the internal consistency (quality assurance across borders between the 
parent and local operations); the pressures to adaptation to formal (e.g. no clear rules on 
profit repatriation, student recruitment to follow national entrance exams), culture related 
issues, e.g. doing business in China, the local partner's different management styles, 
customers' different learning styles and so on. However, interaction between informal and 
formal institutions offered the UK side opportunities to better understand institutional 
expectations. 
'I was in China responsible for quality insurance. The Chair of our Chinese partner 




have a lot of interaction with Chinese governments on how we assess quality of a university. 
They (MoE) did not just send us their forms to fill in, instead asking that this is the criteria 
we have for assessing the quality for a university, what you think. I understand that they are 
looking at what we want in our offering particularly and thinking to establish it in China. So, 
to certain extent, we just go to China and put our British things in China (Seconded 
President, UK, JV1).' 
 
To warrantee a standardized UK academic systems was implemented in China campus, the 
UK side seconded senior management and key functional personnel to their JVs in China. In 
JV1, the first 72 professors were UK academics, helping to build teaching and research 
capabilities. JV2's key functional areas, such as leaders of academic faculties, administration, 
human resource, financial management and quality control were also filled by UK staff. At 
the senior management level, the former Chancellor of the UK university in the case of JV1 
and the former Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the UK university in JV2, both of Chinese origin, 
were assigned as the first president (JV1) and first Vice-president (JV2)5. They played an 
important role, not only because they understood the UK and Chinese HE system and culture, 
but also they brought in Guanxi and enabled the interaction between Guanxi and formal 
institutions which helped the UK side make appropriate strategic choices.  
 
In SB operations, the standardized UK mechanisms (i.e. external examiners, an examination 
board, second marking, and student staff liaison committees that were absent in a normal 
Chinese university) was implemented. While the difficulties to make organizational changes 
to deploy UK staff in the operation, the daily operations were carried out by the Chinese 
partner  university, and the UK side remotely monitored the operations on-line through 
Skype, email, video conferences. Notably, Guanxi enabled trust to be developed between two 
sides and hence the UK side trusted the Chinese side to do so. Joint committees (Steering, 
and Academic), where members from two sides met twice a year, were established to 
governed the operations. In contrast, in DB operations, where the UK side perceived high 
institutional pressures, operational responsibilities and daily duties of the Chinese operations 
were left to the Chinese side. Quality was controlled through the designated program 
coordinators in the UK who visited China at key points. There was knowledge flow from the 
parent university to the local operation and virtual communications between local tutors and 
module leaders in the UK, e.g. in DB franchise operations, but mainly focusing on 
understanding the shared teaching materials.  
 
The separated management made the DB mode of operation suffer from institutional changes. 
For example, students needed a Visa to move to the UK. The tightened Visa policy changes 
in 2004 due to a tragedy in the UK almost ruined the operations of one of the DB cases.  
‘The incident happened in 2004, twenty-one Chinese cockle pickers died, hence we had 
problems with visa applications in the summer of 2004 for the students coming to the UK. 
That year, there were 35 students recruited for the 1+1 project, but almost all were rejected 
for the Visa, and some students failed for several times. Since then, the project was coming 
down, there were 21 in the following year, some of them still suffered Visa rejection, in the 
next year followed there were only 3 students (Project Director, UK, DB v2).’   
 
5 The president or a legal person of a JV university in China must be a Chinese citizen as 




To respond to the perceived institutional pressures for standardization (to have a standardized 
English teaching and learning environment by students, partner university, and UK 
universities themselves) and localization (non-academic aspect, e.g. logistics; students' eating 
and accommodation habit), peripheral services in the two EJVs were provided in line with 
the UK provision but adapted to local needs where necessary.  
'As far as it is possible, the provisions of services are similarly run here. It cannot be exactly 
the same, there are differences, e.g. we have a very big sensible counselling service in the 
UK, but it is not the core provision yet in Chinese universities. So differences exist but 
depending on what areas, other examples like, hall residence is slightly different, the food is 
different … Most of models, we call quality manual that sets up everything about the 
operation of our university (UK parent), from regulation of the students, the process of 
student applications, how students are assessed to complain procedures, are mirrored our 
university (UK parent), so all the academics there know the 'bible', or we call it manual.' 
(Assistant Director for Transnational Education, UK, JV1). 
In addition, the two JV campuses were constructed either to mirror the UK campus (JV1) or 
was based on the UK side’s briefings (JV2). Both campuses recruited their own international 
students, built English libraries, and shared on-line academic resources as well as career 
information with the parent universities. To contrast, all the other modes operated on the 
existing campus of the Chinese partners. Limited UK features were presented in SB modes, 
e.g. English library, while little UK inputs were reflected in DB modes.          
Relatively, the DB cases suffered from inappropriate understanding of formal and informal 
institutions. The formal institutional environment in China became more transparent and 
regulated, e.g. the MoE started to re-evaluate all existing China-foreign HE collaborations in 
2007. As a result, the operations in four out of six cases in a DB mode were either to 
terminate (due to the visa policy change, or did not pass the re-evaluation) or the progression 
route was changed to conform to the stricter policies.      




By empirically examining UK universities' internationalization in China, this research reveals 
how the interaction between formal and informal institutions affects organizations’ perceived 
institutions, which in turn determines strategic choices in host country operations, as 
summarized in Figure 2. Our findings contribute to the institutional theory and international 
business in three main ways.  
First, our study advances the understanding of how formal and informal institutions interact 
in the context of the internationalization process. By doing this, we bring informal institutions 
to the forefront, departing from the tradition of either overlooking informal institutions or 
studying informal institutions as ex-post factors in support of formal institutions (Hernandez 
and Nieto, 2015). Although scholars have noted this shortcoming (North, 1990), research has 
not caught up in the past two decades. Our findings reveal that informal institutions directly 




the institutional landscape that shapes organizations' strategic decision and operations in a 
host country – a missing piece of the puzzle in  existing literature (Ang et al., 2015; Holmes 
et al., 2013).  
In particular, our findings showed that informal institutions, particularly Guanxi (as discussed 
by Wang, 2000) knitted by key personnel in the organization and its partner in a host country 
proactively interacts with formal institutions which helps organizations break through 
institutional barriers to achieve internationalization ambitions.  First, the interaction helped 
not only clarify formal institutional ambiguity but also catalyze the development of formal 
institutional environment (e.g. legal procedures) where a radical new mode of operation could 
be allowed to implement. This implies that the interaction could help initiate a favourable 
formal institutional environment change. Second, the interaction helped the UK side gain 
important information that could not be acquired through public channels, e.g. it enables the 
UK side understand the local governments' expectations and requirements, which helps avoid 
conflicts with institutions in operations. Finally, interaction helped convince government 
officials, achieve their understanding and support, e.g. raise capital, and enforce contracts. In 
return, interaction brought in great value to the UK side to operate in China with institutional 
voids. 
In contrast, in the cases where Guanxi was not well established, the lack of interaction with 
formal institutions deteriorated the UK side's unfamiliarity, and difficulties in understanding, 
and conforming to institutional environment. Therefore, findings reveal that, informal 
institutions, e.g. reflected in Guanxi could help organizations compensate the weak formal 
institutions in China to achieve organizational goals, but in the condition when it interacts 
with formal institutions, particular when implementing a radical new mode of operations, e.g. 
and EJV or SB, which advances the existing literature (Wang, 2000; Peng 2003). Moreover, 
findings reveal that the level of the established Guanxi, either at the organization or 
department level, determines the effect of the interaction, in return, drove organizations to 
make different strategic choices of entry strategy and mode of operations.  Indeed, actors at a 
senior management level within the organizations are more sensitive to changes in 
environment that may affect organization's interests, preferences, and choices of strategic  
behaviour (Chang, 2011). They tend to develop and use Guanxi for the organization's best 
interest; hence, their strategic behaviour in managing Guanxi would more significantly affect 
organizational strategies than others who are at lower level or  outside the organizations 
(Chang, 2011).  
Second, our findings contribute to the understanding of how perceived institutional 
environment that influence organization decisions, which confirmed with Brouthers (2013). 
This explains why UK universities, entering the same market and facing the same macro 
institutional environment changes, selected different modes operating in China. On the one 
hand, the organization-specific conditions can affect the decision makers' perception of 
institutional pressures and so the strategic choices. For example, at micro level, the UK 
universities' different ranking or reputation affected their perception of institutional pressures. 
Organization with higher ranking were under greater micro institutional pressures in order to 
maintain and enhance reputation and hence willing to deploy great resources to local 
operations. Whereas those who have lower ranking passively responded to 
internationalization and turned to local partners for local operation responsibilities and help 
establish reputation in the global market. From another aspect, this also implies that not every 




(Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 2007). Indeed, compared to non-equity modes, an 
equity JV offers hierarchical control (Williamson, 1985) over the local operation, under 
which strategic routines, particularly tacit organizational knowledge, from parent 
organization could be more effectively transferred to local operations, hence it was conducive 
to achieving internal legitimacy (Zhang, Zhao & Ge, 2016) (reputation enhancement and 
quality consistency). Second, interaction between Guanxi and formal institutions mediated 
organization's perceived institutional pressures. Interaction reduced the effect of unfamiliar 
hazards and the established Guanxi through which trust was nurtured helped reduce the 
relational hazards in EJVs and SBs (Hitt et al., 2016), but not in DBs where the perceived 
institutional pressures remained high while the Guanxi was absent.    
Finally, the strategic choices of the arrangement of local operations were resulted from the 
perceived formal and informal institutional pressures. This study reveals how UK universities 
strategize in operations to respond to institutional pressures to succeed in China, namely, how 
things should be done, a missing value in the existing literature (Ang et al 2015; Brouthers, 
2013; Cantewell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Hitt, Li & Xu, 2016; Peng, 2003). Findings 
reveal that  the UK universities standardized (to keep the authentic UK practices) or localized 
(to adapt to local institutions) local operations in terms of core (academic program, research, 
management) and peripheral services, as detailed in Table 3 and 4,  to balance the perceived 
institutional pressures. Hitt, Li and Xu (2016) find that, when organizations perceived high 
external pressures to operate in a host market, they tend to take a lower ownership stake in 
exchange for external legitimacy, whereas a high ownership stake in response to strong 
internal isomorphic pressures. Our findings partially support this. However, a higher 
ownership structure, e.g. a JV, was not only for achieving internal legitimacy but also to 
meeting the local governments' preference and regulation, market, partners, and customers' 
tastes and demands. Our findings emphasize that the correct interpretation of institutional 
expectations is important. The UK organizations' unique social position (foreignness trait) 
enabled them to innovatively respond to institutional pressures (Roger and Edman, 2014), e.g. 
the maintained authentic UK education varied in different mode of operations was a selling 
point. Over-localized operations, e.g. little differentiation in core elements (academic 
programs, research and teaching) from local Chinese universities reduce the appeal of the UK 
HE service in China. This challenges the conventional thinking that local responsiveness 
leading to localization increases the appeal of a foreign product (Bartlet & Ghoshal, 1989; 
Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Strikingly, findings reveal that informal institutional differences 
could directly constrain the strategic choice of local operations, e.g. arts could not be 
internationalized through a DB franchise mode, which emphasizes the role played by 
informational institutions in internationalization. Hence, our findings responded to an 
unanswered question, that is, how the strategic choices could be achieved in operations under 
the perceived institutional pressures. 
 
Overall, facing dynamic institutional environment changes in China, UK universities entered 
China by employing different entry strategies. Our study supports that, through creative 
organizational designs, some organizations can manage unfavourable institutional effects on 
their operation better than others (Lau et al., 2002). Findings emphasize the importance of 
developing organization's institutional capability (Oliver, 1997), which will not only increase 
organizations' strategic choice, but also managing institutional changes, e.g. visa policy 
changes, the Chinese government's audit over all existing China-foreign cooperative projects, 





Our study focuses on how the interaction of formal and informal institutions affects 
organization's perceived institutional pressures, in return, determines their strategic choices in 
internationalization. Based on evidence from 10 UK universities' international operations in 
China, our study enhances the institution theories (North (1990) and contributes to the IB 
research by bringing informal institutions to the forefront, and particularly, looking at how 
the interaction between informal institutions and formal institutions, that reveals intricacies of 
institutional environment, affects organization's perceived institutional pressures, and hence 
determines their strategic choices in internationalization. Our study emphasizes the 
importance of  the perceived institutional environment that influences organization decisions. 
More importantly, our research reveals how organizations strategize in operations to respond 
to institutional pressures to succeed in internationalization. These findings offer practical 
guidance for organizations in internationalization to deal with the different institutional 
pressures when making decisions on why, how and what to standardize or localize in the 





Abdi, M., & Aulakh, P.S. (2012). Do country-level institutional frameworks and inter-firm  
      governance arrangements substitute or complement in international business 
relationships? 
      Journal of International Business Studies, 43, 477-497. 
Ahlstrom, D. & Bruton, G.D. (2010). Rapid institutional shifts and the co-evolution of 
entrepreneurial firms in transition economies, Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice,  34 (3), 531–54.  
Ang, S. H., Benischke, M. H. & Doh, J. (2015). The interactions of institutions on foreign 
market entry mode, Strategic Management Journal, 36, 1536-1553.  
Aragon-Correa, A. & Sharma, S. (2003). A contingent resource-based view of proactive 
corporate environmental strategy, Academy of Management Review, 28 (1), 71-88.  
Bartlett, C. A. & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing cross borders: the transnational solution. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
Barney, J. B. (2001). Is the resource-based "view" a useful perspective for strategic 
management  research? Yes.  Academy of  Management Review, 26: 41-56. 
Boisot, M. & Child, J. (1996) From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: explaining China’s 





Brouthers, K. D. (2013). A retrospective: institutional, cultural, transaction cost influences on 
entry mode choice and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 44 (1): 
14-22. 
Brouthers, K. D. & Hennart J-F. (2007). Boundaries of the firm: insights from international 
entry mode research. Journal of Management, 33: 395-425. 
 
Cantewell, J., Dunning, J.H. & Lundan, S.M. (2010). An evolutionary approach to 
understanding internal business activity: the co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional 
environment, Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 567–586. 
Chang, K. (2011). A path to understanding guanxi in china's transitional economy: variations 
on network behavior. Sociological Theory, 29 (4): 315-339. 
Chang, YC., Kao, MS., Kuo, A. & Chiu, CF. (2012). How cultural distance influences entry 
mode choice: The contingent role of host country's governance quality, Journal of 
Business Research, 65, 1160-1170. 
Child, J. (1972). Organizational structure, environment and performance: the role of strategic 
choice, Sociology, 6, 1-22.  
Child, J. (1997). Strategic choice in the analysis of action, structure, organizations and 
environment: retrospect and prospect, Organization Studies, 18 (43), 43-76. 
Child, J., & Tse, D.K. (2001). China’s Transition and its Implications for International 
Business. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(1), 5-21. 
Cuervo-Cazurra,  A., Maloney, M. M., & Manrakhan, S. (2007). Causes of the difficulties in 
       internationalization. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(5):709–725. 
 
Dunning, J. H. & Lundan, S. M. (2008). Institutions and the OLI paradigm of the 
multinational enterprise, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 25, 573-593.  
Garrido, E., Gomez, J. Maicas, J. P. & Orcos, R. (2014). The institution-based view of 
strategy: how measure it, Business Research Quarterly, 17, 82-101.  
Helmke, G. & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research 
agenda, Perspectives on Politics, 2 (4), 725-740.  
Hennart, JF. and Slangen, A. HL. (2015). Yes, we really do need more entry mode studies! A 
commentary on Shaver, Journal of International Business Studies, 46, 114-122.  
Hernandez, V. and Nieto, M. J. (2015). The effect of the magnitude and direction of 
institutional distance on the choice of international entry modes, Journal of World 




Hitt, M.A., Li, D. & Xu, K. (2016). International strategy: from local to global and beyond, 
Journal of World Business, 51, 58-73.  
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related 
values, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
Hofstede, G. (2010). The GLOBE debate: back to relevance. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41 (8), 1339-1446. 
Holmes, R. M., Miller, T., Hitt, M. A., & Salmador, M. P. (2013). The interrelationships 
among informal institutions, formal institutions, and inward foreign direct investment, 
Journal of Management, 39 (2), 531-566.  
Horak, S.& Restel, K. (2016). A dynamic typology of informal institutions: learning from the 
case of Guanxi, Management and Organization Review, 12 (3), 525-546.  
House, R.J., Hanges, P.J.,  Javidan, M. & Dorfman, P.W. (Eds.)(2004). Leadership, culture 
and organizations: the GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
House, R. J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W. & Sully de Luque, M.(2006). A 
failure of scholarship: response to George Graen's critique of GLOBE. Academic of 
Management Perspectives, 20 (4), 102-114.  
Lau, CM, Tse, D. K. & Zhou, N. (2002). Institutional forces and organizational culture in 
China: effects on change schemas, firm commitment and job satisfaction, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 33 (3), 533- 550.  
Lauth, H. J.  (200). Informal institutions and democracy, Democratization, 7 (4), 21-50.  
Lekovic, V. (2011). Interaction of formal and informal institutions-impact on economic 
success, Economics and Organizations, 8 (4), 357-370.  
Leung, K. (2008). Chinese culture, modernization, and international business, International 
Business Review, 17, 184-187.  
Meyer, C. R. and Peng, M. W. (2005). Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: 
transactions, resources, and insititutions, Journal of International Business Studies, 36 
(6), 600-621.  
Meyer, K. E.,  Estrin, S., Sumon, B., Kumar, B.S. & Peng, M.W. (2009). Institutions, 
resources and entry strategies in emerging economies, Strategic Management Journal, 30 
(1), 61-80. 
Milliken, F.J. (1987). Three types of perceived uncertainty about the environment: state, 
effect, and response uncertainty, Academy of Management Review, 12 (1), 133-143.  
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the process of economic change. New Jersey, Princeton 




Oliver, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and resource-
based view, Strategic Management Journal, 18 (9), 697-713.  
Owens, M., Palmer, M., & Zueva-Owens, A. (2013). Institutional forces in adoption of 
international joint ventures: empirical evidence from British retail multinationals. 
International Business Review, 22(5), 883–893. 
Prahalad, C. K. and Doz, Y. L. (1987). Multinational mission: balancing local demands and 
global vision, New York: Macmillan.  
Peng, M. W. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choice, The Academy of 
Management Review, 28 (2), 275-296. 
Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y., & Jiang, Y. (2008). An institutional-based view of international 
business strategy: a focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 39, 920-936.  
Ra, W. (2008). The emergence of institution-based strategy of international business and the 
implications for U.S. multinational enterprises, Journal of British and American Studies, 
19, 347-378.  
Rodrigues, S. and Child, J. (2003). Co-evolution in an institutionalized environment. Journal 
of Management, Studies, 40, 2137–62.  
Roxas, H., Lindsay, V., Ashill, N., & Victorio, A. (2008). Institutional analysis of strategic 
choice of micro, small, and medium enterprises: Development of a conceptual 
framework. Singapore Management Review, 30(2), 47-72. 
Scott, W. R. (1995). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Sercu, L. (2004). Assessing intercultural competence: a framework for systematic test 
development in foreign language education and beyond. Intercultural Education 15 (1): 
73-89.  
Wang, H. (2000). Informal institutions and foreign investment in China. The Pacific Review, 
13 (4): 525-556.  
 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Xu, D. & Shenka, O. (2002). Institutional distance and the multinational enterprise 
      Academy of Management Review, 27 (4), 608-618.  
Young, M.N., Tsai, T., Wang, X., Liu, S. & Ahlstrom, D. (2014). Strategy in emerging 
economies and the theory of the firm, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31, 331-354.  
Zhang, Y., Zhao, W. & Ge, J. (2016). Institutional duality and political strategies of foreign-













Table 1.  The Sample 
      
  Equity joint ventures1 
Co-operative joint ventures  
Single-based Dual-based Franchise Validation 
EJV1 EJV2 SB1 SB2 DB f1 DB f2 DB f3 DB v1 DB v2 DB v3 
Location 
(UK/China) 
England England England England England England England England Scotland England 
Ningbo Suzhou Beijing Hangzhou Beijing Shenzhen Beijing Zhengzhou Nanjing Beijing 
Year of initial 
negotiation 2003 2003 2003 2002 1996 2002 2002 1999 1999 2005 
Year of 1st 
































1 ( research 





















































































2 UG programs 














UK degree awarded in the UK 
 
 






China Dual degree 
for in-plan 
students4 






• Legal ownership  
• 50/50 owned by the UK 
and Chinese side 
• Approved by MoE 
• Legal person in 20??: 
Chinese 
• Contract-based 
• Not a legal entity 
• Approved by MoE 
• Director in 20??: Chinese 
• Contract-based 
• Not a legal entity 
• Approved by the UK, in-plan recruitment 
• Director in 20??: Chinese 
• Contract-based 
• Not a legal entity 
• Director in 20??: Chinese 






























































































































t Manager , 
UK 
university 









































staff , UK 
university 









• Senior lecturer 
in marketing , 
UK university 
• Director of 
international 
department, 
UK university  
• Dean of 
department, 
UK university  
• Vice-principal,  
UK university 









Notes: 1. There were only two HE JVs in China, both with UK universities. Our sample was 100% of the population. 2. University ranking 
(source is confidential for data protection purpose). 3. Project 211 was launched by the Chinese Ministry of Education in 2008 to develop around 




from the central and local governments (Li & Yang, 2014). 4. In-plan students were those that attended the national university entry exam 































































to approve  
new 
applications 
once a year 
and 
announced the 
result on the 
platform 
Notice of the 
General Office of 


























































• Permitting on-line 
supervision  





































• Rapid expansion of what? 
• Shifting from informal, 
incidental, laissez-faire stage 
to State-guided market  
 
 
Systematic, structured, regulated but turbulent market 
 
 
More standardized, strictly regulated and relatively 
stable market   
Permitted  
operationa















Table 3.  Research Findings  
 
          Cases 
 Local 
 operations  
Equity                                 Non equity 
Joint venture Single-based Dual-based Franchise Validation 




























• Teaching: 100% by the UK 
and internationally recruited 
staff in Years 2-4 
• Year 2-4: UK degree program 
• Teaching language: English 
• Quality standard and 
assessment 
• Teaching: 50% by fly-in UK-based 
staff in a block structure 
• Quality standard 
• Teaching language: English  
• on-line academic resources 
• A UK degree program is broken 
into 2 parts: 2 years in China, 1 
year in the UK 
• The part taught in China is identical 
with that in the UK 
• Teaching material: UK identical  
• Quality standard, assessment 
• High tacit programs, e.g. art cannot 
be localized  
• Training shadowing  
• Degree: a UK degree awarded in 
the UK 
• Validate part of a degree program 




• Y2-4 UG program 
entirely taught in 
China 
• Teaching style:  
  Year 2-4: UK- 
dominated 










• Teaching in Year 1: 100% by 
China recruited staff  
• Adjusted as 4-year programs: 
Year 1- modules to satisfy 
Chinese HE system 
 
Teaching: 50% by local partner Teaching: 100% by local tutors 
Teaching language: mixed  
• A UK degree program is broken 
into 2 parts: 2 years in China, 
equivalent to the first year of a UK 
degree program, followed by 2 
years in the UK 
• Quality standard, assessment  
• The part taught in China:  designed 
by the Chinese university 
• Teaching material: designed 
locally 
• Taught: by local tutors 
• Chinese 





• Year 1: modules 
to  satisfy Chinese  































• Research expertise transferred 
to China 
• Research centres  
• Joint international 
conferences, funding 
application, publications 













              No research  
   
   









pollution,   
sustainable   
energy,   
innovative    





4 G wireless,  
 metabolic  












DB f2: one member of staff in the 
UK used the operation in China as a 



















• Management expertise on 
running a university transferred 
to China 
• Board of JV: some senior 
members from the UK 
• Key positions including HR,  
financial mgt, quality control, 
administration are filled by the 
UK side 
• First president (JV1), first vice-
president (JV2) 
• Faculty: 1/3: seconded from the 
UK , 1/3: internationally 
recruited based on the UK 
standard 
• Management expertise on running 
one or two programs transferred to 
China 
• Joint committees  
• UK academic management system  
•  UK management mechanisms: 
examination board, external 
examiner, first and second markers, 
student staff liaison committees and 
private tutors 
•  Students had UK university ID and 
email accounts  
• Income: tuitions fees were split 
between two sides 
• Daily management: UK managers 
are available on-line 
• Joint committees, met once a year 
• UK academic management system 
applied mainly in assessment 
• UK coordinators pay random visits 
to help resolve academic problems 




• No joint committees 
UK coordinators visit China to 











• Non-academic operation 
management 
• Faculty:   1/3  from local partner 
 
• Daily on-site management 
• Non-academic aspect of operation 
 



























• Campus: mirror the UK (C10); 
built based the UK briefings 
(C9) 
• On-line UK library: available 
• Career service: on-line career 
information access 
• Exchange opportunity: yes 
• International students: targeting 
at 25% (C10), 10% (C9)  
• Campus rules: UK dominated 
for academic issues 
• Library: UK provided English text 
books  
• On-line UK library: available  
• On-line UK library: available 
 
 
Students are the UK university's 
students when they move to the 
UK 

















• Dining halls, food  
• Accommodation 
• Other non-academic activities 
 
• Campus: existing Chinese partner's  
• Campus rules: Chinese university 
rules for all students 
• Career service: offered by the 
Chinese side for all students on 
campus  
• Food, accommodation: local style, 
same as all other students on 
campus 
• Campus: existing Chinese partner's  
• Campus rules: Chinese university 
rules for all students 
• Career service: offered by the 
Chinese side for all students on 
campus  
• Food, accommodation: local style 
 
• Campus: existing Chinese partner's 
university  
• Students are the UK university's 
candidates  
• Food, accommodation: local style 
• Career service: offered by the 
Chinese side for all students on 
campus  
• Campus rules: Chinese university 





Second order themes 
(Perceived institutional 
pressures for  
standardization 
 and localization) 
              Aggregate dimensions 
(Strategic choices of entry strategy and 
modes of local operations) 
 





















                        Fist order concepts 
    (Interaction between formal and informal 














Uncertain to being 
regulated 






















 university level   
Established 
department level 
Not well established, 


























































Home market: visa 















High ranking in 
specific field 
Low ranking 
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• English Library 
• UK students 
ID 
  
  DB (franchise/validation) 
•Part program 
•Academic 

















Table 4. Perceived institutions and strategic choices of local operations 
                Cases 
Perceived 
institutions & 
 strategic choice  
C 





• Highly uncertain and 
complicated 
• Modes of entry were not 
clearly stated (except C10) 
• 1995 Interim Provision 
Changing from highly 
uncertain to being regulated 
Being more regulated and 
relatively stable 
• Allowed modes of entry:  
  EJV 
• SB: not specified 
• 2003Regulations 















• Norms, mental models: 
heavily influenced by the 
closed and planned 
economy  
• Newly opened market to 
the world, less 
understanding of Western 
culture and UK HE 
•  Guanxi: not established, 
both sides knew each other 
randomly introduced by 
past employees or agents 
• Norms, mental models: 
changing to embrace a 
more market-oriented 
economy 
• Opening up, better 
understanding of Western   
culture and education 
• Norms, mental models:  
market economy-oriented 
and with international 
outlook  
 Embracing different 
cultures and rationally 
accepting Western 
education  
•  Guanxi: well established, 
at department level through  
Deans 
Guanxi: well established, 
at the university level, 












• Chinese partner leveraged 
Guanxi to interact with 
department leaders of MoE 
• Break barriers for a SB 
mode 
• Drove favourable formal 
institutional changes on a 
SB mode of operation 
 
• Intensive 
• Key actors who knitted 
Guanxi interacted with 
MoE and local 
governments  
• Break barriers for an EJV 
mode 
• Drove favourable formal 
institutional changes on an 
EJV mode of operation 
Perceived 
institutions 
Extremely high            Very high High to manageable 
• Local government's 
regulation changes, 
customer and market's 
needs and preferences 
changes 
• UK Visa policy changes  
• QAA: quality insurance on 
part of a UK program 
taught in China 
• Local government's  
regulation and preferences, 
different customer and 
market needs, local 
partner's expectation 
• QAA: quality insurance on 
one or two UK programs 
entirely taught in China  
• Local government's 
regulation and preferences, 
different customer and 
market needs, local 
partner's expectation, local 
industries' expectation,  
differences in business 
operation system, culture, 
management style 
• QAA: quality insurance on 
UK HE over a full-fledged 
university  
• Organization-specific: low 
ranking, survivability, cost 
pressure 
Organization-specific: 
reputation in specific field, 
department level initiative, 
difficult in organizational 
changes, cost pressure  
Organization-specific: high 
ranking, reputation 




Entry strategy DB 
validation 
DB 


























• Equity, 50% ownership 




• Reproduce part of a UK 
standardized or a UK 
equivalent program 
• Orienting to local   
customers     
• Reproduce UK 
standardized 1 or 2 
programs 
• Orienting to local, UK or 
regional customers 
• Standardize where feasible 
and localize where 
appropriate 











• Parent organization 
depends on local partners' 
resources in operation 
• Tightly coupled 












• Explicit academic 
knowledge flows from 
parent to subsidiary (DB 
franchise) at program level 
• Limited flow between 
•   parent and subsidiaries 
(DB validation) 
• Tacit and explicit academic 
knowledge flow from parent  
   to subsidiaries at department 
   level. 
• Experience sharing and 
model replication in other 
markets 
• Tacit organizational 
knowledge flows 
• Bi-or multi-directional 
  Large flow (tacit and 
explicit) between parent 






Part program value chain 
exists in the host country 
Full program value chain 
exists in the host country 
Full university value chain 





• Centralized at the corporate 
level: academic control 
(standardized teaching 
material); decentralized to 
subsidiary: daily operation 
(DB franchise) 
  Decentralized to the 
subsidiary (DB validation) 
• Centralized at the corporate 
level: academic control 
(standardized system and 
core teaching) 
• Decentralized to the 
subsidiary: daily operation 
control 
• Centralized at corporate 
level: full academic control 
•  Joint control with local 











Cost efficiency by using a 
cheap model to reach a 




Exploiting parent and local 
partner's program 
reputation to achieve 
economies of scale by 
sharing experience and 
replicating the model in 




localization into parent 
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